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The Company Law Review must continue to facilitate 
the change from a closed to a more open culture.
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers, recently gave a speech at the TUC/IPPR Seminar on Corporate Governance. In 
it, he referred to the ongoing Company Law Review, and 
stressed the importance of reshaping company law in 
order that it may reflect the needs of the modern economy 
and provide a clear framework within which companies 
may operate. On the subject of directors' duties, Mr Byers 
recognised that companies today do not operate in a 
vacuum. Indeed, the way companies are run affects a 
whole range of interests beyond those of the immediate 
shareholders, including customers, creditors, the
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environment and the wider community. He pointed out 
that companies need to be flexible so that they may 
consider the wider interests of the company alongside 
those of their investors, and not merely focus on short- 
term profits, as they currently do:
'... the way companies are governed also affects those who work 
Jbr them. Decisions taken by companies affect customers, 
creditors, the environment and the wider community in which the 
companies concerned operate... that is why good corporate 
governance is about how companies treat their workforce, how 
they have an impact on the environment, how they help the wider 
community, how they impact on the developing world ... we 
must ensure that the framework of company law allows and 
encourages directors to take wider responsibilities into account 
... we need an approach which actually recognises the needs of 
stakeholders, which enables companies to look at the interests of 
stakeholders'
THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
This idea of the 'stakeholder' and its involvement in the 
company/society is a familiar theme of this government, 
having featured in its pre-election literature and been 
pursued since in various policy areas. But given the 
content of the speech, how can we ensure that directors 
take their wider responsibilities seriously? In an apparent 
shift in policy emphasis away from their pre-election 
position, further recognition of the corporate stakeholder 
did not gain favour with Mr Byers. Instead, he indicated 
that the way forward was to look at disclosure of relevant 
issues by companies. He thought disclosure would need to 
cover important issues such as 'relations with suppliers, 
customer complaints, employment policies, corporate 
governance, environmental, social and ethical policies 
where these are material to the business.' He further 
stressed the importance of 'quality rather than quantity of 
information so that shareholders, customers and other 
stakeholders can make informed decisions.' Indeed, Mr 
Byers made a valid point about the stakeholder approach, 
in that it will be difficult for directors to take into account 
all interests (if such a duty is indeed imposed), as there 
will always be conflicts of interests which may be difficult, 
if not impossible, to resolve.
At first sight, it is difficult to disagree with Mr Byers. 
Disclosure is a just and fair obligation for companies to 
shoulder. If their activities affect the livelihood of 
consumers, employees and suppliers as well as the 
environment, then these affected parties or their
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representatives should be able to enquire into company 
affairs where it affects them, in order that they can make 
decisions about their affairs and dealings with theo
company. In conjunction with this, they should also be 
able to represent their interests before the company in 
order to influence the way the company makes decisions 
where it concerns them. Despite the much-heralded 
reality of globalisation, it is still very much the fact that 
many communities are tied directly to the economic good 
fortune (or otherwise) of a few large companies in their 
locality who provide direct and indirect employment as 
well as funding the social infrastructure.
This article will look at how third parties can currently 
obtain information about the way companies are run by 
directors and ask if this is adequate. We will also question 
if this flow of information from directors to 
affected/interested parties can be improved. If 
information is the key to proper corporate governance, 
then the law must ensure that these parties can gain access 
to information they need without undue hindrance.
DISCLOSURE TO NON-EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTORS
The last decade has seen the rise of the non-executive 
director as monitor of company activities. In simple 
terms, the non-executive director can be identified as an 
individual who serves on the board of directors of a public 
limited company but does not work for that business 
enterprise on a full-time basis. Corporate governance 
literature ascribes to the non-executive (as distinct from 
the full-time executive director) a pivotal role in 
reforming the practices, standards and performance of the 
board of directors within UK companies. The 
effectiveness of that role depends on the quality of 
information received by those individuals. They usually 
come into these positions having substantial experience of 
the sector: as board members they should receive all board 
papers for the meetings they attend as well as both formal 
and informal briefings from their colleagues.
However such disclosure is neither guaranteed nor fully 
effective. There is no means of vetting the consistency of 
supply and quality of information passed to the non- 
executives. There may or may not be provision for the 
non-executive to have access to outside paid advice. 
Furthermore the utility of the information provided may 
be negated by the contractual arrangements with the 
company. If the non-executive's contract provides for a 
fixed number of hours per year, will this give the individual 
enough time to get to grips with the issues underpinning 
the company's strategy and policy so as to give advice that 
is timely, relevant and of value? If non-executives are to be 
effective as 'independent' monitors and indeed act as links 
between shareholders and the board, the informational 
aspects of their roles need to be addressed, if necessary, by 
regulation.
DISCLOSURE TO SHAREHOLDERS
Shareholders are a strange breed of people in the UK. 
They invest in their companies mainly for financial gain. 
There is little loyalty to the company on the part of the 
majority of shareholders. On the contrary, they often sell 
up and leave the company in the event that they are 
unhappy with the performance of the company. They also 
seldom involve themselves in the decision-making process 
of the company, but are happy to leave the management of 
the company in the hands of their directors. This attitude, 
although very slowly changing with regard to institutional 
shareholders, is still true of private individual 
shareholders.
Rightly or wrongly, directors take advantage of this
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apathy. The law does not, as a general principle, obligate 
directors to inform shareholders of how the company is 
run, how the board makes decisions or which particular 
director has breached his duty to the company. Indeed, 
shareholders cannot (unless they are also directors) 
generally attend board meetings, nor are they permitted to 
see the board minutes or papers. Vital information which 
shareholders may need to know is often concealed as a 
result. Further, directors choose what kind of information 
to reveal to shareholders, and when. Information passed 
on to shareholders often takes the form of glossy circulars 
telling shareholders about a particular acquisition, disposal 
or share issue. Such circulars, together with any other 
publicity material do not always inform shareholders in 
plain terms how well 'their' company is performing nor 
provide an accurate depiction of the state of the company 
at all. Thus information which is given may be somewhat 
complex for the ordinary shareholder to absorb easily. If 
shareholders do not understand what is being presented, 
it is little wonder that they may be reluctant to question 
policies and decisions, however strongly they may feel 
about particular decisions taken by the company.
What about the use of general meetings as a forum for 
disclosure? The general meeting is billed as an important 
event where management gives an account to shareholders
o o
of how they have run the company. Directors can be 
placed under the spotlight and can be asked to explain 
certain policy decisions, justify controversial measures and 
generally be available to provide/disclose information 
about the company to interested shareholders. The reality 
however, is somewhat different, and several flaws can be 
detected in our current system.
For one, before convening the meeting, directors are 
required by law to send certain information to all 
shareholders entitled to attend and vote (Companies Act 
1985 s. 370(2)). Shareholders must be sent a notice 
convening the meeting, as well as other relevant 
information such as reports, accounts and a summary of 
resolutions to be passed at the general meeting. The 
information sent is very brief indeed. The law does not 
require that full information be made available to
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shareholders, although certain resolutions may need to be 
set out in full. The more diligent shareholder, who may 
want to view any texts in their entirety, such as proposed 
changes to articles, will have to visit the registered office of 
the company. In addition, current practice only dictates 
that relevant documents (such as articles) be made 
available for inspection 15 minutes before the meeting 
(Stock Exchange Rules). This hardly leaves any time for 
detailed consideration, and the situation is exacerbated if 
other shareholders also want to inspect the same 
documents, or where the documents contain controversial 
matter. The shareholder may of course then choose to 
question the directors directly on a specific matter at the 
meeting, but even then, under the law, he is not entitled to 
an answer. Indeed, if the item which he wishes to consider 
is not on the agenda, there is no obligation on the 
chairman to allow any questions on it. Not only is all this 
frustrating for the diligent shareholder, it also detracts 
from the principles of transparency and disclosure.
"INFORMATION IS THE KEY
If information is the key to proper corporate 
governance, then the law must ensure that these parties 
s can gain access to information they need without undue 
hindrance.
It is important to point out however, that the law does 
impose a duty on directors to disclose certain information 
about the company elsewhere. Indeed, there are different 
levels of disclosure. Some kinds of information about the 
company are available to the general public at Companies 
House where anyone can obtain information regarding the 
incorporation of the company, the allotment of shares, 
registration of charges, annual accounts etc. (Companies Act 
1985 s. 18, s. 88, s. 242, s. 401). Information about the 
company is also available to the general public at the 
company's registered office. This includes the register of 
debenture holders, register of members, and the register 
of directors' interests in the company etc. (Companies Act 
1985 s. 191, s. 325, s. 356). Other kinds of information 
are available only to shareholders, such as minutes of the 
general meetings, terms of directors' service contracts and 
directors' reports etc. (Companies Act 1985 s. 383, s. 318). 
Further, directors must also disclose certain information 
about themselves, such as their names, particulars of any 
other directorships held within the last five years, interests 
in any securities in the company etc. (Companies Act 1985 
s. 289, s. 324), interests in contracts with the company, (s. 
317). when there is a sale of company assets to 
directors/purchases by the company of directors' assets (s. 
320) or where they have received compensation for loss of 
office (s. 312). Their service contracts are open for 
inspection by members as is the level of remuneration they 
receive.
Although the volume of information presented through 
company circulars, AGMs and the Companies Registry
may appear at first glance impressive, the information 
itself is either refracted through the perspective and views 
of the board and company employees or is presented in 
such a form as to render it inaccessible or 
incomprehensible to many shareholders. Nor do these 
forms of disclosure tend to inform the shareholder or 
stakeholder, as Mr Byers puts it:
'.. .how companies treat their workforce, how they have an 
impact on the environment, how they help the wider community, 
[how] they impact on the developing world'.
DISCLOSURE TO STAKEHOLDERS
General meetings are viewed as a closed affair, an 
encounter between shareholders and their directors (art. 
38, Table A). Other interested parties may wish to attend 
and participate in the general meeting, or question directors 
on controversial decisions. They may not do so. These 
parties may be employees, consumers, creditors, suppliers 
and representatives of the local community whose lives the 
activities of the company affect on a daily basis. They may 
have valid points to raise, matters to clarify or questions to 
ask of the directors. Their inability to do any of this at 
meetings is a great disadvantage. Of course, some of these 
stakeholders may prefer to meet personally with directors, 
or write to the company to obtain information which 
concerns them. Even so, given that the current duty on 
directors is to their company alone, they are not obliged to 
meet with stakeholders to discuss company affairs. Neither 
are they bound to provide any information requested. If 
these stakeholders are to be able to make informed 
decisions about the company and their relationship with it, 
then it is obvious that current practice must change.
Another interesting point to note is that employee 
participation at general meetings is an alien concept in the 
UK. Unless employees also hold shares in the company, 
they may not attend general meetings. Even if they do hold 
shares, they will, under the law, be deemed to attend these 
meetings as shareholders. Their rights and interests as 
employees take a back seat. It may, therefore, be the case 
that they are unable to question directors or obtain 
information from directors about company policy with 
regard to their rights as employees. Can employees obtain 
information from directors in other ways? In preparing 
the annual report directors are under an obligation to 
prepare a report for each financial year stating what action 
had been taken during the year to provide employees with 
information on matters concerning them, and whato '
consultation with them or their representatives has 
occurred so that their views can be taken into account in 
decision making (s. 234 Companies Act 1985, Schedule 7 
Part V). Pt V only applies to companies with 250 
employees or more). It is not stated to what extent 
information is to be provided to employees or their 
representatives, or the level to which they must actually be 
consulted. Companies may therefore choose to give this
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provision their own interpretation and effectively insert 
what they like in the relevant section.
Pressure groups also find it difficult to obtain 
information about the company. To be sure, many 
companies adopt ethical policies to protect the 
environment, ensure fair wages for third world labourers, 
boycott third world producers who exploit child labour or 
pledge support for various charities. However, the 
relationship between companies and pressure groups is an 
uneasy one. If all is well, and the support for a particular 
cause is in favour of the company (such as raising its profile 
in the market), it may co-operate with pressure groups and 
form long term relationships with them. However, if the 
company itself is accused of engaging in unethical or bad 
practice, it may be very difficult indeed for pressure groups 
to obtain any relevant information confirming this or any 
other fact. Acquiring a shareholding in the company will 
usually entitle the individuals to attend the AGM to put 
questions to whoever agrees to answer them. However, as 
discussed earlier in this article, the utility of the closely 
scripted, well-managed AGM to the small shareholder is 
negligible. Indeed there is no obligation for companies to 
divulge information specifically to pressure groups. 
Information is certainly the key to exposing acts of a
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particular company but without proper means of access to 
such information it is difficult to compel change or 
promote good practice on the part of companies.
How can the flow of information be improved?
If the government is serious about disclosure and
o
transparency, the flow of information from companies to 
interested/affected parties can be improved. A few 
suggestions include:
  making documents both more readily available and 
easily comprehensible. In the former case this can be 
done by encouraging the regular flow of up-to-date 
information (enforced by regulation, if necessary) to 
non-executive directors, shareholders and other 
interested parties; in the latter case, encouraging the 
provision via company web sites of policy and strategy 
details aimed at enhancing shareholder value, as well as 
financial and other information free from accountancy 
jargon. Interested parties should not have to rely solely 
on microfiche, Companies House Direct or flicking 
through an Annual Report and Accounts to access such 
information;
  making all board members available at AGMs for 
questions and providing a longer time for questions. 
Even better, overhaul the traditional structures and have 
more frequent 'mini' AGMs where directors agree to 
report back to a further meeting with answers if their 
questioners so request;
  providing guaranteed financial support in certain cases; 
for example, to non-executives in their role as monitors 
of the company.
Last but not least, selected interested groups could be 
allowed to participate in the decision making process of 
the company. In the Netherlands for example, there are 
specific provisions in the law for employee participation in 
the affairs df the company via works councils. Every 
company with 35 or more employees must have a works 
council which is entitled to information about the affairs 
of the company and must be consulted on every matter 
affecting the employees. Important issues such as 
termination of employment of a large number of 
employees, or a radical change in working conditions, 
must first be approved by the works council. 
Incorporating such features into UK company law might 
just encourage a practice of openness and transparency as 
the process of liaising and consultation with these groups 
will compel directors to furnish various kinds of relevant 
information.
CONCLUSION
There will indeed be much debate about what disclosure 
should mean, who should regulate it and how much 
disclosure by the company should be compulsory. 
However if companies are seen to be transparent in their 
dealings, and not shy to disclose matters when asked to, 
then benefits will accrue to that company in relation to 
shareholder value as well as in maximising stakeholder 
input. It is undoubtedly necessary that the Company Law 
Review continues to facilitate the change from a closed to 
more open UK corporate culture. It is to be hoped that 
the present government encourages and nurtures this 
change within its forthcoming reforms.
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